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Abstract
I consider two seemingly unrelated puzzles; 1.Why is relative performance evalu-
ation (RPE) used less in CEO compensation than agency theory suggests? 2.Why is
sometimes, e.g., for fund managers, a mediocre performance more highly rewarded
than excellence? I consider a simple tournament model, where agents can in‡uence
the spread of output in addition to its mean. I show that standard tournament
rewards induce risky and lazy behavior from the agents. This …nding sheds light on
Puzzle 1. Second, I consider a scheme that ranks agents according to their relative
closeness to a benchmark k. I show that there exists intermediate values of k such
that the risky-lazy problem of the standard tournament can be mitigated. This
result sheds light on Puzzle 2.
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11 Introduction
To the extent that real-world rewards are based on measures of performance, they often
depend on relative performance. For example, promotion is awarded to the most pro-
ductive member of a level in an organization; the CEO of the least pro…table …rm in an
industry gets …red, and the mutual fund with the highest return one year gets a higher
investor in‡ow the next year.
The main theoretical rationale for rewarding relative performance stems from the In-
formativeness Principle (Holmstrom, 1982), which, informally, states that an optimal com-
pensation contract conditions rewards on any variable that is (incrementally) informative
about work intensity (e¤ort). Recently, a corollary of the Informativeness Principle known
as the relative performance evaluation (RPE) hypothesis has been extensively tested in
the rapidly growing empirical literature on CEO compensation.1 The idea behind the
RPE hypothesis is that if …rms in the same industry face some common random shock,
like changes in industry demand, an optimal compensation contract for a CEO makes his
payment conditional on the pro…ts of the other …rms in the industry (in addition to being
made conditional on the pro…t of the CEO’s own …rm, and possibly other variables). The
higher the pro…t of the other …rms, the lower the reward of the CEO.
Although the …ndings of the empirical literature are not conclusive, researchers in
the …eld tend to be puzzled by the lack of evidence for RPE in the CEO compensation
data. For example, Aggarwal & Samwick (1999a) ’suggest that relative performance
evaluation considerations are not incorporated into executive compensation contracts’ (p.
104, ibid.). And, Murphy (1999, page 40) states that: ’The paucity of RPE in options
and other components of executive compensation remains a puzzle worth understanding’.
A seemingly unrelated puzzle is that rewards based on relative performance do not
always go in favor of the agent with the highest performance; sometimes ’modest’ per-
formances are more highly rewarded than ’very high’ performances. For example, at
workplaces, due to envy or other e¤ects, very high performances are sometimes discour-
aged by peers.2 While the rewards from peers are of informal nature, there are also
1See Murphy (1999) or Prendergast (1998) for an overview of this literature, and for more on the
Informativeness Principle.
2Interestingly, one of the most well-known pieces in the Norwegian satiric literature, ’The Law of
2examples where formal rewards work in favor of mediocrity. For example, fund manager
compensation schemes sometimes has an outlier e¤ect: a very low return and a very high
return yields a lower reward from the principal than performances in the middle. Such
incentives are puzzling, since they seemingly do not motivate hard work, e.g., in acquiring
and analyzing …nancial data.
The purpose of this paper is to show that adding a notion of risk taking to the agents’
choice set in a standard tournament model both can shed light on both why RPE is
used less than agency theory suggests (Puzzle 1), and why rewards are sometimes non-
monotonic in performance (Puzzle 2).3
In a tournament, a principal sets a prize, and several agents then compete to attain the
highest observed output, and win the prize. This paper departs from the existing literature
on tournaments by assuming that agents can in‡uence the spread of their distribution of
output, in addition to the mean. To increase the spread of output is assumed to have no
intrinsic cost. Thus neither the …rm’s expected pro…ts nor the worker’s utility depends
directly on the agents’ choice of risk. However, there is an indirect link: if the equilibrium
risk taking is high, then the marginal increase in the probability of winning from increasing
e¤ort is low, and hence equilibrium e¤ort is low. A low equilibrium e¤ort in turn implies
a less lucrative prize structure (since expected total production is low). Notice, however,
that it is not obvious that equilibrium risk taking will be high; if an agent decides to work
hard, then he has an incentive to choose a low risk.
It turns out that there is a huge moral hazard problem in the model. In Proposition
1, it is shown that with no limits to possible risk taking, agents exert zero e¤ort and
choose an in…nite risk in equilibrium. Since the expected production is zero in this case,
Jante’ by Aksel Sandemose, describes a society where excellence is strongly discouraged. For example,
two of the ten laws of Jante are ’Thou should not believe you are better than anyone else’, ’Thou should
not believe you are something’. Although the laws of Jante tend to focus on self-beliefs, rather than
accomplishment, it seems fair to say that they strongly discourage excellence.
3It should be emphasized that since data on the (explicit) incentives facing fund managers is scarce,
Puzzle 2 is more a speculation than the …rmly established Puzzle 1. However, an example of a non-
monotonic reward structure was provided to me by the CEO of Skandia Fund Managment (SFM), Harald
Troye (SFM manages approximately $50 billion in the Scandinavian Market). SFM …rst selects an initial
pool of fund managers. Second, the relationship is terminated with those managers that get a return too
low or too high compared to a benchmark return. SFM engages in a long(er) term relationship with the
remaining managers.
3the tournament breaks down as a reward scheme. This result is somewhat modi…ed in
Proposition 2, where possible risk taking is limited, but still the moral hazard problem
is grave. Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 together indicate that a reason why CEO
compensation to a small extent depends on the relative performance of the …rm is that
putting too much emphasis on relative performance in compensation contracts may induce
risky and lazy behavior from the CEOs.
Given this negative result, I ask whether the tournament reward scheme can be mod-
i…ed to avoid the risky-lazy ’trap’ of the standard tournament. To this end, a scheme
where agents are ranked according to the relative closeness of their output to a bench-
mark k is considered. The idea behind this scheme, labeled k-contracts, is that excessive
risk can be avoided, which in turn can provide incentives for working hard.
The second main result states that there exists intermediate values of the benchmark k
such that …rst best level of e¤ort can be implemented under risk neutrality. This positive
result sheds light on why sometimes higher rewards are given to agents with a modest
performance than to agents with a very high performance.
It is not hard to motivate why risk taking is a plausible additional choice variable
to e¤ort in environments where rewards are made conditional, or potentially are made
conditional, on relative performance. For example, employees aspiring for promotion can
choose to work in a risky environment or a safe environment before choosing how hard
to work. CEOs can choose whether the …rm should pursue a safe or a risky R&D pro…le,
and a variety of other decisions that also a¤ects the risk pro…le of a …rm.4 And, …nally,
fund managers can choose the riskiness of their portfolio, in addition to choosing how
much resources to spend on providing and analyzing relevant stock information.
I now discuss related literature. First the literature on tournaments is dealt with, and
then I turn to discussing literature that provides alternative explanations to the two puz-
zles outlined. Several recent papers in the …nancial literature employ tournament models.
For example, Brown et al (1996) and Chevalier & Ellison (1997) consider the portfolio
choice of mutual fund managers, and ’... suggest that viewing the mutual fund market as
a tournament in which all funds having comparable investment objectives compete with
4For example, the CEO can in‡uence which type of workers the …rm employs, or whether the …rm
should enter emerging markets or not.
4one another provides a useful framework for a better understanding of the portfolio man-
agment decision-making process’ (Brown et al., p. 85). Importantly, the empirical results
of those papers indicate that the in‡ow of new investors to a fund depends crucially on
its relative performance, and moreover that risk taking is an important decision variable
for mutual fund managers.
Tournaments were …rst studied by the classic Lazear & Rosen (1981), who showed that
a …rst best provision of e¤ort can be implementable with a tournament reward scheme.5
Tournament models with risk taking as the choice variable was …rst considered by Bronars
(1987).6 Importantly, the papers of the received tournament literature consider e¤ort or
risk taking as choice variables for the agents, in contrast to the present paper that considers
the interaction between e¤ort and risk taking.
On Puzzle 1, Aggarwal & Samwick (1999b) argue that imperfect competition in the
product markets can neutralize the RPE e¤ect on compensation schemes. (However, if
Cournot competition prevails, rather than Bertrand competition, the model of Aggarwal &
Samwick (1999b) strengthens the prediction of RPE hypothesis.) In contrast to Aggarwal
& Samwick (1999b), I point out harmful e¤ects of RPE in compensation schemes, even
when product markets are competitive.7
With respect to Puzzle 2, Heinkel & Stoughton (1994) derives an optimal reward
scheme for fund managers, where managers with a ’too’ high return will be replaced.
However, this result refers to the solution of an adverse selection problem, while the scheme
proposed in the present paper solves an unrelated moral hazard problem. Moreover, there
5Later papers in the tournament literature include Nalebu¤ & Stiglitz (1983), Bhattacharya & Guasch
(1988), Clark & Riis (1998), and Fullerton & McA¤ee (1999).
6Bronars (1987) showed that leaders in a sequential tournament have an incentive to ’lock in’ their
gains by playing safe, while followers choose a risky strategy. Recently, several papers have proved a
variety of other properties of risk taking in tournaments. For example, Cabral (1997) proves a similar
result to Bronars (1987). Dekel & Scotchmer (1999), using tools from evolutionary game theory, …nd an
evolutionary pressure towards risk loving preferences if those who breed in a population is determined
in a contest-like fashion (and where a child inherits the risk preferences of its parents). And Hvide
& Kristiansen (1999), investigating the selection properties of tournaments, show that the (expected)
quality of the winning agent may decrease in the (average) quality of all the competing agents.
7An older argument against RPE is that compensation schemes that put too much weight on relative
performance are sensitive to collusion between the agents that are compared. For illustration, if the sum
of compensation for two workers is constant, then both workers would be better o¤ if they could collude in
slacking their e¤ort. However, since collusion typically requires a long-term relationship, such arguments
seems more applicable to explain lack of intra-…rm RPE than lack of inter-…rm RPE.
5is no notion of risk taking in the model of Heinkel & Stoughton (1994).8
Part 2 sets up the model and contains the analysis, while Part 3 concludes. Some of
the proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Analysis
Section 2.1. sets up a standard tournament model with e¤ort as the only choice variable;
Section 2.2 adds a notion of risk taking to that model, and Section 2.3 introduces k-
contracts.
2.1 The Tournament Model
There is one risk-neutral principal and several agents, for convenience assumed to be
only two.9 To focus on incentive e¤ects, the agents are assumed to be risk-neutral. The
value of agent i’s output equals Yi = ¹i + "i, where ¹i is agent i’s choice of e¤ort,
and where "i is an iid shock with E("i) = 0 and E("2
i) = ¾2. Yi and Yj are the only
contractible variables. The cost of e¤ort for agent i, Vi(¹i) is assumed to satisfy Vi’, Vi”
> 0 and Vi(0) = Vi’(0) = 0. The …rst-best level of e¤ort, denoted ¹¤
i, is the ¹i that solves
V ’(¹i) = 1. For convenience, there are only two agents, with a symmetric cost of e¤ort;
V1(::) = V2(::) = V (::). Furthermore, "i is assumed to be normally distributed.10
Under a rank-order scheme, the principal …xes the prizes W1 and W2 [where W1 > W2],
and the agents then compete in winning the …rst prize W1, which is awarded to the agent
with the highest Yi. Expected utility for agent i, Ui, equals,
8In their seminal paper on the basic principal-agent model, Grossman & Hart (1982) construct an
example where a non-monotonic reward scheme can solve a moral hazard problem, but due to assumptions
that violate the monotone likelihood ratio property. [Brie‡y, a distribution of output that satis…es MLRP
has the property that the higher observed output, the harder the agent probably worked.] In contrast to
Grossman & Hart, I show that a non-monotonic scheme may perform well without assuming any violation
of MLRP.
9All results can easily be generalized to hold for an arbitrary number of agents.
10With the exception of the normality assumption, the model in this section is identical to the standard
tournament model of Lazear & Rosen (1981) [the normality case is encompassed by their model]. As will
be clear below, the normality assumption is not required to obtain the results.
6Ui = PiW1 + (1 ¡ Pi)W2 ¡ V (¹i) = Pi¢W + W2 ¡ V (¹i) (1)
where ¢W = W1 ¡W2, and Pi = Prob(Yi > Yj) = Prob(¹i ¡¹j > "j ¡"i). For agent
1 we get, P1 = Prob(Y1 > Y2) = Prob(¹i ¡ ¹j > ") = G(¹1 ¡ ¹2), where G(::) is the cdf
of " [" ´ "2¡ "1]. Clearly " is normally distributed with E(") = 0 and E("2) = 2¾2. The









= 0; i = 1;2: (2)
Notice that due to the option-like structure of the prizes, only the di¤erence between
the …rst and the second prize, ¢W, enters the …rst order conditions. By symmetry, if there
exists an equilibrium, then in equilibrium ¹1 = ¹2, and the outcome is purely random,
i.e., P = 1
2, since G(0) = 1





= ¢Wg(0);i = 1;2: (3)








, i = 1;2 (4)
From inspecting (4), it can easily be seen that ¹¤
i is implementable with an appropriate
choice of ¢W. This observation leads to the well-known equivalence result: under risk
neutrality, both individual schemes (that base compensation on individual output) and
tournaments can implement …rst best level of e¤ort. As we shall see in the next section, the
equivalence between individual schemes and tournaments is no longer true when agents
in addition to e¤ort can choose risk.
7Notice also that it follows from (4) that the equilibrium e¤ort is decreasing in ¾. In-
tuitively, a higher ¾ makes the tournament ’more random’, which decreases the marginal
gain of increasing e¤ort (the increased probability of winning), and hence reduces equi-
librium e¤ort.
2.2 Risk Taking in the Tournament Model
I adhere to the assumptions of the previous section, with one exception. The shock "i is
now assumed to have variance equal to ´2
i, where ´2
i = ¾2 + s2
i, with ¾ > 0 and si 2 <+.
The interpretation of ¾ is the level of non-diversi…able, background, noise, and si is the
degree of voluntary spread in the output distribution. Thus si is a choice variable for
agent i, while ¾ is, as before, a parameter. The cost of adjusting si is assumed to be
uniformly zero, implying that the …rst best level of e¤ort is not a¤ected from introducing
risk taking.
Notice that risk taking added to the agents’ choice set makes no di¤erence for the
e¢ciency of individual schemes, they still implement the …rst best level of e¤ort.11 It is
now showed that the equivalence between linear schemes and tournaments breaks down
when risk taking is added to the agents’ choice set.
Proposition 1 The unique equilibrium in the tournament game induces in…nite variance
and zero e¤ort from both agents.
Proof. I …rst show that X¤ = fsi = sj = 1 and ¹i = ¹j = 0} is a Nash Equilibrium,




irrespectively of his choice of ¹j and sj. Therefore, ¹j = 0 and sj = 1 is a
best reply to ¹i = 0 and si = 1 , and hence X¤ is a NE. To prove that X¤ is a unique
NE, …rst consider tuples with (i)¹i < ¹j. For (i) to be a Nash equilibrium, clearly si = 1,
since that choice of si maximizes Pi. That implies ¹i = 0. But, in that case ¹j = 0 is
a best reply from agent j, which contradicts (i). So in any Nash equilibrium we have
11Consider a linear scheme with reward to agent i equal to, a+biYi, where a and bi are parameters set by
the principal. The principal sets bi = 1, and expected utility of an agent equals ¹i¡V (¹i), independently
of the choice of risk. The …rst order condition for optimal e¤ort thus becomes, 1 ¡ V 0(¹i) = 0, which
is identical to the …rst order condition for …rst best. Hence individual schemes can implement …rst best
even when risk taking is an additional choice variable.
8that ¹i = ¹j. Tuples with (ii)¹i = ¹j > 0 are now excluded. If ¹i = ¹j then P = 1=2.
But since both players have positive cost of e¤ort, player i can gain by changing ¹i (one
obvious improvement is to set ¹i = 0 and si = 1 ). But then we are in case (i). Hence
neither (i) nor (ii) is consistent with Nash behavior, and X¤ is a unique NE.
Thus if agents can choose their level of risk taking, in addition to their e¤ort, a tour-
nament induces extremely risky and lazy behavior from workers. Hence the equivalence
between individual schemes and tournaments is no longer true when risk taking is added
to the agents’ choice set. Proposition 1 contradicts the intuition of Lazear & Rosen (1981),
which state: ”In this paper the worker has no choice over [the variance of individual out-
put]. This does not a¤ect the risk neutral solution but does have an e¤ect if workers are
risk averse, since they tend to favor overly cautious strategies ... .” (footnote 1, page
843).12
Since Proposition 1 is obtained under rather special assumptions, let me comment on
its robustness. First notice that exactly the same argument, and the same negative re-
sult, goes through if risk-averse agents play the tournament. Hence agents choose in…nite
variance and zero e¤ort in equilibrium even if they are risk averse. Second, independence
and normality of the shocks is not necessary to obtain the result; all that is required by
G(::) for the result to go through is that g(0) is decreasing in ´i. Since lack of indepen-
dence in the sense of a positively correlated shocks is one of the main justi…cations for
applying tournaments (see e.g., Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz 1983), it is worth noticing that the
negative result also holds for any degree of correlation between the shocks, provided that
an equilibrium exists. Hence, Proposition 1 is rather robust in these respects.
However, since the meaning of ’in…nite variance’ is somewhat unclear, it seems useful
to consider a case where there are limits to risk taking. It is now assumed that si 2
[smin;smax], 8i, where 0 < smin < smax, with smax …nite. Hence risk taking is bounded by
a lower limit smin and an upper limit smax. To avoid non-existence problems, I consider
the game where the agents …rst choose level of risk taking and then, after observing each
12Also Murphy (1999) seems to be overly optimistic with respect to the optimality properties of RPE
when the agent has additional choice variables to e¤ort (page 41, ibid.): ’RPE remains a strong prediction
of the model after expanding the managerial action set, since paying based on relative performance
provides essentially the same incentives as paying based on absolute performance, while insulating risk-
averse managers from common shocks.’
9others choice, decide how hard to work.13 The following result indicates that the basic
moral of Proposition 1 also holds with more general assumptions on possible risk taking.
Proposition 2 In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, both agents choose si = smax.
in the …rst stage, and the corresponding low e¤ort in the second stage.
Proof. In equilibrium at stage 2, P =
1
2
independently of level of risk taken at stage
1. Since the equilibrium e¤ort is a decreasing function in the sum of s1 and s2, both
agents choose si = smax at stage 1, in dominant strategies. Since the equilibrium risk
taking at stage 1 is high, the equilibrium e¤ort at stage 2 is consequently low.
Proposition 2 shows that even when there are limits to risk taking, the moral hazard
problem induced by a tournament reward structure is serious: equilibrium behavior by
the agents is risky and lazy. Notice that a comparative statics exercise on smax yields
a simple result; the equilibrium e¤ort is monotonically decreasing in smax. This can be
interpreted as the greater opportunity of taking risk, the less e¢cient is a tournament
reward structure.14
Since real life rewards typically are conditioned on a mixture of relative and absolute
performance measures, it is important to see whether the result is robust to letting the
incentive scheme also depend on absolute measures. Making the compensation to agent i
depend on his absolute output, in addition to relative output, through a linear component,
would make the agent care about expected output, in addition to the probability of
winning. But the linear component in the scheme does not a¤ect the incentives for risk
taking; the agents will still choose smax in the …rst stage to decrease the equilibrium e¤ort
in the second stage. Hence the risky-lazy problem is present also when the compensation
scheme combines relative and absolute factors.15
13For example, sales persons choose an area to work in before deciding how many hours to work, a
CEO determines the R&D pro…le of the …rm before deciding how much e¤ort to put into the job, and a
fund manager specializes in low or high-risk shares before deciding how much information to collect and
process.
14Thus if the principal can a¤ect smax cheaply, he would set it as low as possible. Notice also that
Proposition 1 is not a corollary of Proposition 2, due to the sequential structure imposed in Proposition
2.
15However, if a term that is linear in output is added to the payment scheme and agents are risk averse,
then there would be a risk-return trade-o¤ that is worth studying further.
10To conclude, Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 together indicate that when agents
can choose both level of e¤ort and level of risk taking, rewarding relative performance
induces risky and lazy behavior in equilibrium. A direct empirical value of this …nding is
that it sheds light on Puzzle 1, why relative performance evaluation is used less in CEO
compensation than what standard agency theory suggests. Speci…cally, if risk taking is
a choice variable for a CEO then the principal (e.g., the board) should be careful in
conditioning rewards on the performance of other CEO’s, since such schemes induce risky
and lazy behavior from CEOs.
Since a tournament insures agents against common shocks, it is interesting to see
whether a tournament can be modi…ed to avoid the risky-lazy ’trap’ of standard tourna-
ments. I turn to that task in the next section. The positive result obtained will shed light
on Puzzle 2, why a modest performance is sometimes more highly rewarded than a very
high performance.
2.3 A Modi…ed Tournament: k-contracts
The idea behind the contract form proposed in this section is that if agents are motivated
to achieve a moderately high output, instead of a very high output, they might get an
incentive to choose a moderate level of risk taking, which, in the next turn, can create
incentives to work hard.16
Consider a modi…ed tournament reward structure, where the winner of the tournament
is the agent with output closest to a …nite benchmark k. To avoid confusion with standard
tournaments, this modi…ed tournament structure is labeled k-contracts.
The distance between k and agent i’s observed output, Di, equals,
Di = jYi ¡ kj (5)
Denote by Qi(::) agent i’s probability of having an observed output closer to k than
16An often-voiced criticism of non-monotonic schemes is that they give incentives to dispose with parts
of the output (if output falls in the non-monotonic range). However, since disposal is equivalent to
theft, this criticism applies to all compensation schemes with marginal reward less than marginal output.
Contracts in practice prescribe punishment for theft (or ’disposal’), if detected. Here, I simply assume
that disposal is not a choice variable for the agents.
11agent j, and hence win the tournament. Formally, Qi(::) = Prob(Di < Dj). The expected
utility for agent i under a k-contract then equals,
Ui = QiW1 + (1 ¡ Qi)W2 ¡ V (¹i) = Qi¢W + W2 ¡ V (¹i) (6)
The following remark clari…es the relation between k-contracts and standard tourna-
ments.
Remark 2.1 If k = 1 the agents play a standard tournament game.
Proof. Recall that Pi(::) is the probability of agent i winning in the standard tour-
nament case, where Pi = Prob(Yi ¡ Yj > 0). I show that Qi(::) and Pi(::) converge when
k goes to in…nity. By de…nition, Qi(::) = Prob(Di < Dj). Since Di > 0; we have that,




j) = Prob[(Yi ¡ Yj)(Yi + Yj ¡ 2k) < 0]: (7)
When k tends to in…nity, (Yi ¡ Yj)(Yi + Yj ¡ 2k) < 0 occurs if and only if (Yi ¡ Yj) > 0.
Hence, from (7), Qi(::) = Prob[(Yi ¡ Yj)(Yi + Yj ¡ 2k) < 0] converges to Prob(Yi ¡ Yj >
0) = Pi(::) when k tends to in…nity.
Remark 2.1 shows that standard tournament reward structure is a special case of k-
contracts; when k tends to in…nity, a k-contract and a standard tournament, as studied
in the previous sections, are identical.
It is intuitively clear that a …nite k will induce …nite levels of risk in equilibrium, when
equilibria exist. However, it is not clear exactly which level of risk taking that will occur,
as a function of k. In providing a link between k and risk taking, the following lemma
will be useful. First a standard de…nition.
De…nition 2.1 (FOSD). Let Gi(d;::) and Hi(d;::) be cdf’s of Di. Gi(d;::) …rst order
stochastic dominates Hi(d;::) if Gi(d;::) ¸ Hi(d;::) for all d, with Gi(d;::) > Hi(d;::) for
some d.
Let F(d;´i) be the cdf of Di, as a function of ´i, holding ¹i and k constant at ^ ¹i and
12^ k, respectively, where ^ k > ^ ¹i. Furthermore, de…ne ´¤





i. Then we have the following.
Lemma 1 F(d;´1





Proof. See the appendix.
Lemma 1 puts an upper bound on the risk taking of agent i in that any choice of
standard deviation ´i larger than ´¤
i generates a distribution of Di that is dominated.
The intuition for Lemma 1 is that ´¤
i is the choice of standard deviation that maximizes
the probability of hitting very close to the benchmark k. If ´i is set larger than ´¤
i then
the distribution generated will perform worse with respect to the probability of hitting
very close to k, and the potential gains from an increased probability of hitting farther
from k does not o¤set this e¤ect.
Corollary 1 Suppose ¾ > k. Then si = 0 is a (strictly) dominating choice for agent i.
Proof. First notice that regardless of ´i, it is dominated for agent i to choose ¹i > k.
Now …x ¹i at ^ ¹i and k at ^ k, where ^ ¹i · ^ k, and recall that ´¤
i = ^ k ¡ ^ ¹i. By a simple
transformation, it follows that a choice of s2
i larger than s¤2
i is dominated, where s¤2
i =
(^ k ¡ ^ ¹i)2 ¡ ¾2 = (k2 ¡ ¾2) + ¹i(¹i ¡ 2k), which is negative for ¾ > k. It follows from
Lemma 1 that si = 0 is a dominating choice for agent i.
The corollary shows that ¾ > k is a su¢cient condition for agents to choose si = 0 in
equilibrium.
Equipped with these results, we have the following.
Proposition 3 For a su¢ciently large ¾, the …rst best provision of e¤ort is implementable
with a k-contract.
Proof. See the appendix.
Hence in contrast to the standard tournament scheme, k-contracts and individual
schemes are equivalent: they both implement …rst best. The intuition behind Proposition
3 is that to avoid excessive risk taking, and hence a low level of e¤ort, the principal
rewards the agent with output closest to a positive constant k rather than rewarding the
13highest output. Reduced risk taking in turn makes it possible to give incentives for e¤ort
by increasing the prize spread, ¢W.
Notice that …rst best can also be implemented if agents in addition to being rewarded
for relative performance, are also rewarded according to their absolute performance. So
Proposition 3 is robust to adding compensation based on individual performance to the
scheme. Second, it is su¢cient for Proposition 3 that the distribution of the shocks has the
FOSD property described in Lemma 1. In addition to the normal, a simple distribution
as the uniform also has this property.17
The empirical value of Proposition 3 is that it gives an explanation for the second
puzzle, why mediocrity is sometimes more highly valued than excellence, e.g., in fund
manager compensation schemes.
Since linear schemes can also implement …rst best in the case where agents choose both
e¤ort and risk, it is not obvious why k-contracts should be preferred to linear schemes.
The downside with individual schemes compared to k-contracts, however, is that they do
not exploit commonality of the shocks, which may important e.g., in the market for fund
managers. Hence k-contracts can insure risk averse agents as well as linear schemes, and
provide stronger incentives. I have computed examples with risk averse agents and found
that k-contracts can dominate linear schemes, provided that agents are not too risk averse
and that shocks are su¢ciently correlated.18
3 Conclusion
This paper has considered an agency problem where agents choose level of risk in addition
to e¤ort. Two main results were obtained. First, opening up for risk taking seriously
increases the moral hazard problem in a tournament; the equilibrium level of risk taking
becomes high, and the equilibrium level of e¤ort becomes low. This result, it was argued,
17It is unknown whether more general distributions have the FOSD property of Lemma 1. However,
even if a distribution of errors does not satisfy the FOSD property, it is conjectured that a modi…ed
technique can be applied to make Proposition 3 hold also for distributions of the shocks that do not
satisfy the FOSD property.
18These examples have been obtained with numerical tecniques for utility functions with constant
absolute risk aversion, and can be provided upon request.
14can shed light on Puzzle 1, that RPE is used less in practice than indicated by the
Informativeness Principle. Second, by modifying the tournament reward structure to give
the prize to the agent with output closest to a …nite benchmark k, rather to the one with
the highest output, …rst best can be implemented. This positive results seems useful in
understanding why compensation schemes, e.g., for fund managers, are sometimes non-
monotonic.
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5 Appendix on k-contracts
I start out with a remark establishing some distributional properties of the stochastic
variable Di, the distance between agent i’s output Yi and the benchmark k. Throughout
the appendix, I skip subscripts when possible.













Proof. Recall that D = jk ¡ Y j, where Y is normally distributed with mean k ¡ ¹












where d ¸ 0. This is just the probability that a single realization of normally distributed
variable with expectation ¹ and variance ´2 falls within a distance d of a benchmark k.









dt, where ® =
p
2(¹ ¡ k ¡ d)
2´
, and ¯ =
p
2(¹ ¡ k + d)
2´
(9)
It is easily checked that F(d;::) indeed induces a probability distribution, i.e., that










¡1 e¡t2dt = 1. Notice that since D2
i is
Â2-distributed, Di is distributed as the square root of a Â2 variable.
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Proof. of Lemma 1.
Recall that, by de…nition, ´2 = ¾2+s2, and ´¤ = ^ k¡^ ¹. I wish to show that any choice
of ´ greater than ´¤ is dominated in the sense of FOSD.
Substitute ¹ = ^ ¹ and k = ^ k into F(d;::) from Remark 1, substitute for ´¤, and















I proceed to show that this expression is negative for ´ > ´¤, and hence Lemma 1 follows.
Denote the …rst term of the right side of (11) by A1, and the second term by A2. Moreover,









. Since A2 > 0,
@F(d;::)
@s
< 0 is equivalent to
A1
A2
< 1, for d > 0. I
17…nish the proof by showing that
A1
A2

























Notice that from (12) it follows that
A1
A2
= 1 when d = 0. I show that
A1
A2
< 1 for any








´¤(2´¤® + ®2 + d2)
(´¤ + d)2(´¤ + ®)2 (13)
which is negative for d > 0. Hence
A1
A2




for ´ > ´¤, and d > 0, and Lemma 1 follows.
Proof. of Proposition 3.
Suppose ¾ is larger than the …rst best level of e¤ort, ¹¤
i. I show that this condition
is su¢cient for …rst best to be implementable. First notice that, for a given k, to choose
e¤ort level ¹i larger than k is a dominated choice for agent i. Hence we can restrict
attention to ¹i 2 [0;k], i = 1;2. Moreover, choose k such that ¹¤
i < k < ¾. Then, by
Corollary 1, si = 0 is a dominating strategy for agent i, and we can restrict attention to









= 0; i = 1;2: (14)










(¹j ¡ k ¡ d)2
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¡1 e¡t2dt, and erfc(x) = 1 ¡ erf(x). Di¤erentiate (..) by ¹1 and

















































































which is continuous and increasing in k. Therefore, since V (::) is convex, the symmetric
equilibrium is increasing in k. From equation (2) and equation (21) it is evident that
the symmetric equilibrium is increasing (continuously) in ¢W, where equilibrium e¤ort
equals k, in the limit. Hence there exist a ¢W such that the e¢cient provision of e¤ort
is implemented.
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